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Abstract 
 
This article seeks to engage Jansen and Young’s recent research on the impact of 
changing federal campaign finance laws on the relationship between organized 
labour and the New Democratic Party.  Jansen and Young use models from 
mainstream comparative politics to argue that unions and the NDP retain links 
due to a “shared ideological commitment” to social democracy, rather than an 
expectation of mutual rewards and despite changes in the global economy.  We 
critically assess the evidence, method of comparison, and theoretical 
assumptions informing their claims and find many aspects 
unconvincing.  Instead, we propose that better explanations of this enduring yet 
strained relationship can be formulated by drawing insights from Canadian 
political economy, labour history and working class politics, and comparative 
social democracy. 
Introduction 
Changes to federal campaign finance laws in 2004 and 2006 represented a radical break with 
conventional Canadian politicking, ending the traditional political parties’ reliance on 
corporations and unions for funding and placing the responsibility entirely on individuals and 
the state.  The reforms introduced a great deal of uncertainty for politicians and academics 
alike, as both wondered what long term impact such changes might have on the relationships 
between political parties and their traditional financial supporters.  In “Solidarity Forever? The 
NDP, Organized Labour, and the Changing Face of Party Finance in Canada” Harold Jansen and 
Lisa Young explore this question as it pertains to the NDP and Canada’s union movement, the 
latter comprising a traditional source of financial support for the party.1
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interviews with union and political party elites conducted since the reforms were introduced, 
they conclude that the “ban on union contributions weakens, but does not mute, the influence 
of labour within the NDP” (Jansen and Young, 2009: 658).  Though strains in the relationship 
have surfaced since these changes, they argue that the two groups have worked to restructure 
rather than sever their ties in the new regulatory environment, in two major ways. For their 
part, the NDP has changed how organized labour is represented within the party, while retaining 
key leadership positions for union representatives (Jansen and Young, 2009: 669-70).  Organized 
labour, meanwhile, has taken up a two-track strategy, retaining its traditional internal 
mobilization of members during election campaigns while also adopting what the authors 
describe as novel independent campaigns designed to focus public attention around issues it 
thinks the NDP should take up (2009: 671-3).  
Despite these findings, the authors seem less certain about why the NDP-union relationship has 
survived the new campaign finance laws restricting union donations to the party.  After testing 
theoretical insights from the comparative literature on parties and unions, they conclude that 
neither the rational exchange nor political economy models can fully explain the persistence of 
the relationship. They assert instead that the link between the NDP and organized labour in 
Canada results from a shared ideological commitment to social democracy, rather than an 
expectation of mutual rewards or a response to changes in the global economy.  Still, why 
Canada has produced this allegedly exceptional outcome when compared to other similar 
countries, the authors admit, is not readily apparent to them (2009: 676). 
Jansen and Young’s contribution here could very well become influential and widely cited for 
two reasons: its focus on campaign finance reform and the NDP, and its attention to organized 
labour as a political actor in Canadian politics.  Their choice to focus on the effect of the new 
campaign finance laws on the federal NDP may strike some as curious, given that the two 
dominant federal parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, were much more reliant on corporate 
funds as a proportion of their total contributions than the NDP was on union money.  As such, 
one might expect the new rules to hurt them more and political analysts to direct their attention 
there.  Yet, as Jansen and Young rightly point out, “…no party is more affected by these changes 
than the NDP because of its unique organic ties to organized labour” (2009: 675).  Their 
attention to organized labour as a political actor also makes their contribution stand out, as 
contemporary Canadian political science rarely notices unions (despite the fact that roughly 30% 
of the Canadian workforce belongs to one) and routinely ignores labour organizations as 
potentially important or influential elites worthy of study. 
For these reasons, we would like to engage Jansen and Young about their findings and analysis.  
For instance, we agree with them that the NDP is a unique party but are not convinced that their 
analysis has captured what is so unique about it.  And while we laud their focus on the politics of 
organized labour, we have concerns that they have not grappled effectively with the complexity 
of that politics.  In challenging their work, we do not intend to dismiss what they have 
accomplished.  Indeed, the authors provide much helpful new information on the restructuring 
of labour representation within the federal party and changes in party finances. Instead, we 
wish to critically examine some of their evidence and their stated rationale for the NDP and 
organized labour’s continued relationship, elements of which we find unconvincing.  Specifically, 
we argue that the authors offer less than systematic evidence to support some of their claims, 
that they fail to highlight the important and sometimes contradictory relations between federal 
and provincial sections of both Canada’s labour movement and the NDP itself, and that their use 
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of theory drawn from rational choice or political economy appears either too reductionist or 
determinist.  By contrast, we will argue that a non-determinist and historicized use of critical 
political economy, drawn from a considerable body of Canadian literature relevant to both the 
NDP and labour, could be utilized effectively to better explain the continuing solidarity between 
these two forces, while also revealing the complexities, variations and evolving tensions in that 
relationship. 
1. Evidence 
Jansen and Young hypothesize that removing union money from the relationship between 
labour and the NDP will lead to a change in their relations.  Put simply, they suppose that if 
labour cannot contribute funds or staff time to the party’s election efforts, the party will have an 
incentive to distance itself from a close association with unions to maximize its voter appeal.  Of 
course, as the party moves in this direction, labour will also see little value in sustaining the 
relationship.  Thus the changes to federal party finance laws limiting union contributions in 2004 
and banning them altogether in 2006 offer a clear opportunity to test the hypothesis. They 
conclude from their research that relations between labour and the NDP were reorganized 
rather than severed as a result of the new legislation on the basis of three kinds of evidence: the 
restructuring of labour representation within the party, the party’s rejection of Blairite ‘third 
way’ electoral strategies, and the development of new independent parallel election campaigns 
by labour.  Upon scrutiny, however, only the first piece of evidence seems compelling, and even 
here the insight is neither new nor entirely unexpected. 
As the authors note, the new campaign finance laws offered both the NDP and organized labour 
a chance to walk away from their historic relationship.  And there were voices in both 
organizations making the case for separation.  Instead, to adhere to the new legal requirements, 
labour and the federal NDP opted to renegotiate their relationship, stopping the flow of money 
but redesigning the party’s internal representational bodies to retain a prominent role for 
labour.  This is fairly clear evidence that simply changing who can fund the party will not 
necessarily affect who has influence within it.  But we need not have waited for the 2004-2006 
federal campaign finance changes to discover this. The BC government banned union donations 
to the provincial NDP in the 1960s but it did not fundamentally alter the influence of the 
powerful union movement within the party (the ban was later repealed in 1972 under the first 
BC NDP government) (Phillips, 1967: 156-7; Phillips, 2010: 112, 114).  Similar bans on corporate 
and union donations were introduced in Quebec in 1977 and in Manitoba in 2000 (Linteau et. 
al., 1991: 518; Wesley and Stewart, 2006).  However, links between both provinces’ union 
movements and the relevant local social democratic party have remained relatively stable. 
The authors also infer that labour has retained influence in the NDP due to the party’s relative 
reluctance to follow the global trend of social democratic parties to embrace a ‘third way’ 
approach to politics, distancing itself from organized labour and moving toward the political 
(and electorally viable) centre.  They note that various pressures in the late 1990s led federal 
NDP leader Alexa McDonough (aided by organized groups within the party like NDP Progress) to 
advocate a ‘third way’ option to make the NDP more electorally competitive.  Yet the party 
rejected the ‘third way’, which the authors credit to the strength of union influence.  
Presumably, the fact that the party continues to eschew the ‘third way’ federally confirms the 
unions’ enduring influence.   
  Canadian Political Science Review 5(1) January 2011 
 
 Solidarity Revisited: Organized Labour and the New Democratic Party (20-37)  
  
23
However, this characterization of the influences affecting such decisions ignores the 
considerable influence of other forces associated with the party, not to mention the strategic 
location of the NDP in the national party system.  The debate over the direction of the federal 
party involved countless individual members and many more organized groups than NDP 
Progress and the labour movement.  For instance, Jansen and Young fail to mention the New 
Politics Initiative (NPI), which was inspired by the activity of anti-globalization social movements, 
had many more adherents than centrist forces in the party, and was arguably crucial in electing 
Jack Layton as federal leader in January 2003 on a platform that promoted stronger links 
between social movements and the party (Whitehorn, 2004: 108; Whitehorn, 2007: 151).  As 
well, the electoral calculus behind the ‘third way’ argument is less persuasive in Canada since so 
many voters choose the federal NDP precisely because it represents an alternative to the 
Liberals and Conservatives (Zwelling, 2001).  Finally, it was not clear to many NDP supporters 
and party activists, not just the unions, that the federal party was in a position to benefit from 
the ‘third way’ option as there was already a party peddling a Blairite blend of fiscal 
conservatism and social liberalism: the federal Liberals (Caplan, 2001: 98). 
The final piece of evidence used to demonstrate the reorganizing rather than severing impact of 
the new federal laws was the unions’ development of new independent issue-based campaigns 
launched during elections, with the CLC’s “Better Choices” campaigns in the 2004 and 2006 
federal elections cited as primary examples.  However, these issue-based campaigns were 
neither new nor brought into being by the new regulations.   Indeed, the CLC had been moving 
in this direction for some time under the leadership of its President, Ken Georgetti (who was 
elected in 1999). 
Curiously, one piece of evidence missing from Jansen and Young’s research is data on the 
federal NDP’s financial state after the first round of new regulations was introduced in 2004.  
Between 2004 and 2006, unions could still contribute a limited amount to federal campaigns but 
Jansen and Young provide no data showing whether this was pursued or what impact it may 
have had.  In fact, it appears that there was much debate within national labour organizations 
about how to respond to the 2004 laws, with numerous legal opinions sought about how labour 
might still contribute to the NDP financially under the new rules (Interview with Ron Stipp2
Of course, the lack of raw data on the post-2006 period may seem obvious given the nature of 
the changes: unions cannot give money and the party now has a federal subsidy to potentially 
make up for the loss of union income.  Yet this assumes that the new laws affect just the 
relationship between unions and the federal party.  But as will be outlined in more detail below, 
the new laws also crucially affect the relationship between different levels of the NDP (e.g. 
provincial and federal sections), a change with arguably more impact financially on the federal 
party than the union/party reorganization. 
, 
January 15, 2010).  Jansen and Young also appear to be premature in assuming that the ban on 
union contributions necessarily ended the unions’ economic or organizational usefulness to the 
NDP.  For example, the CLC has turned its attention to supporting municipal candidates (where 
union contributions remain, for the most part, legal) who are closely identified with the NDP as 
part of a long-term strategy for grooming future NDP candidates at the federal and provincial 
levels (Savage, 2008: 180-181).   Union polling data and membership lists also continue to make 
the rounds, which federal NDP riding associations use to identify potential party contributors, 
who are then contacted as individuals by party volunteers.   
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2. Method 
Methodologically, Jansen and Young have pursued their research by focusing on national union 
bodies and the federal branch of the NDP.  Given that the new laws were passed by the federal 
parliament and affect federal election campaigns, this does, at a glance, appear to be a logical 
approach. But neither the NDP nor Canada’s labour movement can be understood by examining 
the federal level in isolation.  Three problems emerge from their national focus: Canada’s labour 
movement embodies profound regional and provincial variation in its approach to politics, the 
NDP itself encompasses considerable ideological differences amongst its provincial branches 
and federal level, and the organization, finances and structure of the provincial and federal 
wings of the party have historically been closely intertwined, making analysis of just one level 
deeply problematic.  As will be demonstrated below, grappling with labour and the NDP 
federally necessarily means addressing provincial and regional variations as well. 
Beginning with organized labour, it should be noted at the outset that any discussion of union-
party relations in Canada must begin by recognizing that Canada is home to two distinct labour 
movements, one in English Canada and one in Quebec (McIntosh, 1999).  Even within those 
labour movements, there exist a number of important internal divisions.  How those divisions 
have influenced patterns of party-union cooperation has been the subject of much research 
(Horowitz, 1968; Archer, 1990; Panitch and Swartz, 2003; Carroll and Ratner, 2005; Savage, 
2010).  While Jansen and Young acknowledge that Canadian labour is “divided and 
heterogeneous” and that “it is probably a misnomer to speak of a single Canadian labour 
movement” (2009: 662), they appear to ignore these important caveats in developing their 
arguments and conclusions.  Their decision to proceed without regard for the linguistic, regional, 
or ideological divisions, within both the labour movement and social democratic parties, paints a 
overly-uniform picture of party-union relations in Canada and limits our understanding of these 
complex relationships.  
Jansen and Young’s failure to distinguish between the labour movement in English Canada and 
the Quebec labour movement is a crucial oversight, given Quebec labour’s historic antipathy 
towards the NDP and the absence of a provincial NDP section there.  While all of Quebec’s 
major union federations are officially committed to complete political independence in the 
realm of electoral politics, large sections of the Quebec labour movement (particularly the 
Autoworkers and the Steelworkers) keep close ties to both the Parti Quebecois (PQ) and the 
Bloc Quebecois (BQ), reflecting organized labour’s strong support for Quebec sovereignty 
(Guntzel, 2000).  The Quebec Federation of Labour (FTQ), Quebec’s largest central labour 
organization, officially endorsed the PQ in the provincial elections of 1976, 1981, 1989, 1994 and 
2007.  The FTQ officially endorsed the BQ in the 1993, 2006, and 2008 federal elections.  
Compared to the FTQ, Quebec’s other major central labour organizations, the Confédération des 
Syndicats Nationaux (CSN) and the Centrale des Syndicats du Québec (CSQ), have shown much 
less interest in officially endorsing political parties, preferring instead to pursue independent 
political action and campaigns designed to shape election issues for both union members and 
political parties.  These campaigns have often times complimented PQ or BQ campaign themes. 
Like its Quebecois counterpart, the English Canadian labour movement does not share one 
approach to electoral politics.  While some unions in English Canada maintain close links to the 
NDP, others have no relationship whatsoever with the party.  Furthermore, different unions 
support the NDP for different reasons.  These are not new developments resulting from the 
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recent campaign finance changes, but rather reflect disparate union histories, cultures and 
ideological approaches.  In short, there is a wide spectrum of NDP-union relationships in English 
Canada not captured by Jansen and Young’s analysis.   
For instance, in their focus on the CLC’s two-pronged strategy of member mobilization and 
independent political campaigns, Jansen and Young neglect important regional variations.  
While regional CLC affiliates may lend support to the federal NDP from time to time based on 
specific political calculations, in no way can the party take their support for granted.  It is also 
worth noting that the Quebec sections of most CLC affiliates (including the six affiliates with 
partisan ties to the NDP) have not demonstrated strong support for the federal NDP in Quebec, 
opting instead to remain neutral or more likely to support sovereignist parties.  While a focus on 
the CLC is significant given its central position in the union-party relationship, attention to its key 
affiliates is equally important given their relative political influence and their sometimes distinct 
approaches to electoral politics.  Jansen and Young note the CAW’s strategic voting initiative 
against the Conservatives in the 2006 federal election, but again overlook important regional 
elements of the story (2009: 665).  The CAW’s Quebec section eschewed strategic voting, 
endorsing the entire slate of BQ candidates instead.  Nor was the CAW the only union pursuing 
this strategy:  strategic voting in federal elections has also been promoted by the Public Service 
Alliance of Canada (PSAC), which has endorsed Liberal, NDP, and BQ candidates in and around 
the national capital region (Savage, 2010: 13). 
Meanwhile, in the realm of provincial politics, we can see even more variation in the relations 
between the NDP and organized labour.  Jansen and Young do acknowledge some of these 
differences in relation to the Ontario NDP government of the early 1990s, arguing that 
‘globalization’ forced the party to distance itself from labour and vice versa (2009: 666).  
However, what actually occurred between unions and the party in Ontario during and after the 
Rae government is more complex and contradictory than this implies.   
Although the NDP’s Social Contract and its attack on free collective bargaining generated a 
major rift between the party and the Ontario labour movement (and particularly its public 
sector affiliates), with the OFL in 1993 formally calling on its member unions to disaffiliate from 
the party, thirteen unions dissented from this vote and advocated for continued union-party 
links.  After the NDP government’s defeat and the election of the rabidly anti-union Progressive 
Conservative government of Mike Harris in June 1995, the labour movement regrouped around 
a new political strategy. Between 1995 and 1998, and through alliances with progressive 
community organizations and social movements, organized labour led a broad-based movement 
against the Harris government’s neoliberal Common Sense Revolution with a series of rotating 
general strikes across the province known as the Days of Action. These protests were designed 
to strengthen links with social movements, cause economic disruption, and highlight the 
damage being done by the Harris Conservatives (Reshef and Rastin, 2003: 133-152).  However, 
the provincial NDP and key OFL affiliates were never entirely comfortable with this extra-
parliamentary activity, and party and union officials worked to contain (and eventually jettison) 
this strategy.   
Eventually, the Ontario Federation of Labour abandoned the Days of Action before the 1999 
provincial election in favour of reconciliation with the NDP.  This alienated several unions who 
were unwilling to forgive the NDP for its past sins.  While most industrial unions and CUPE 
Ontario backed the NDP, another group of unions came together with community organizations 
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to form the Ontario Election Network, promoting strategic voting as a method of blocking the 
Conservatives’ re-election (Reshef and Rastin, 2003: 167). The Teachers’ unions, the CAW, 
OPSEU, the Ontario Nurses’ Association, and building trades unions targeted two-dozen key 
ridings, endorsing a roughly equal number of Liberal and NDP candidates.  The Network’s 
electoral strategy ultimately failed.  The Conservatives were returned to power with an even 
larger share of the popular vote and the NDP lost a significant share of its seats and political 
influence.  Notwithstanding this result, the same group of unions redoubled their efforts to 
displace the Conservatives through strategic voting in the 2003 provincial election.  Recast as 
the Working Families Coalition, the building trades unions, teachers’ unions and the CAW 
launched major third party advertising blitzes in both the 2003 and 2007 provincial elections, 
ostensibly asking the public to vote for the Ontario Liberal Party in order to defeat the 
Conservatives (Savage, 2010: 15).  Predictably, the Working Families Coalition’s decision to act 
as a sort of front group for the Ontario Liberal Party raised the ire of partisan unions with close 
ties to the Ontario NDP, thus reinforcing the already deep divisions in Ontario labour politics.  
The point here is that relations between Ontario labour and the NDP cannot be read off of 
‘globalizing pressures’.  Instead, they need to be mapped with careful attention to variations, 
the particular nuances of locale, and the actors’ understandings of the strategic and historic 
context. 
While Jansen and Young draw on provincial examples like Ontario to make their case, other 
provinces central in the NDP’s history – like Saskatchewan and Manitoba – are overlooked 
entirely.  This is a critical problem in their argument, given that the most important interactions 
between unions and parties actually occur in provincial politics.  After all, the vast majority of 
labour’s direct legislative priorities fall within provincial jurisdictions, provincial sections of the 
NDP have tended to be more electorally successful than the federal party, labour organizations 
(with the exception of Quebec’s) have typically affiliated to the party through its provincial 
sections, and the day-to-day party-union relationship plays out primarily at the level of 
provincial Federations of Labour (Savage, 2010: 11). 
In other words, it is difficult to draw universalizing conclusions about the union-party 
relationship in Canada because our labour movement appears to have no uniform electoral 
strategy. Various electoral strategies have been employed simultaneously, and sometimes at 
cross-purposes, even within a single province.  These divisions are both regionally and 
ideologically based.  Although Jansen and Young’s extensive interviews offered an opportunity 
to examine or shed light on those ideological and regional divisions, the evidence gleaned from 
them appears to leave readers with the impression that no such divisions exist. Moreover, the 
choice to anonymise the union affiliations and locations of their interviewees prevents the 
reader from judging whether Jansen and Young sampled a broad, representative, cross-section 
of the labour movement.  For example, evidence derived from a series of interviews with 
officials from the Steelworkers (USW), the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), and 
the Communications, Energy, and Paperworkers (CEP) would tell a very different story than 
would evidence gathered through interviews with officials from the CAW, the Teamsters, or the 
Laborers’ International Union of North America (LIUNA).  While the former group of unions have 
longstanding and durable relationships with the NDP – and would therefore more likely conform 
to the ‘ideological exchange’ explanation advanced by Jansen and Young – the  latter group of 
unions do not, and are less likely to lend support for the ideological commitment model. In 
short, depending on the constellation of interviews conducted by Jansen and Young, any one 
explanation in their typology of union-party relations might have been affirmed. Of course, we 
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understand their rationale for anonymity but even granting this, they could have provided tables 
with a breakdown of interviews by province, region, sector etc. that would have shed some light 
on the range and character of their sample interviews. 
Turning to their treatment of the NDP, conclusions drawn from the national level alone tend to 
mask the complexity and diversity of ‘social democracy’ as practiced by various branches of the 
party.  Recall that Jansen and Young argue that labour influence prevented the federal party 
from turning to the Blairite ‘third way”, while globalizing pressures on the Ontario NDP 
government forced the provincial party to abandon its traditional labour allies.  This 
characterization of the factors shaping the party’s social democracy and relations with organized 
labour is challenged when we include all the other provinces with relevant experience of NDP 
governing. Just what comprises the “shared ideological commitment” Jansen and Young refer to 
becomes unclear amid a clear turn to the ‘third way’ at the provincial level. 
These ambiguities are clearest in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. In Saskatchewan, the NDP (and 
its predecessor, the CCF) has dominated provincial politics in the postwar period, forming 
governments from 1944 to 1964, 1971 to 1982, and again from 1991 to 2007.  In many 
accounts, the party’s most recent stretch in office (from 1991 to 2007), characterized by 
aggressive deficit reduction, corporate tax cuts, and hospital closures, had more in common 
with neoliberal rather than social democratic ideology (Stanford, 2001: 95; Warnock, 2005: 89-
91).  In the area of workers’ rights, the Saskatchewan NDP government raised the ire of the 
labour movement in 1999 by ending strikes by nurses and power utility workers with back-to-
work legislation (Warnock, 2005: 95).  In private, the union leadership was livid, but in public, 
most of the labour movement was careful not to criticize the party (Byers, 2002: 75).  Despite its 
increasingly neoliberal orientation, the union leadership remains firmly committed to supporting 
the Saskatchewan NDP at election time.  Labour support for the party endures because the 
union leadership is “trapped, choosing always to support the NDP as the lesser of the evils.  
With labour in its back pocket, the NDP leadership has concluded that it has to do very little to 
retain labour’s support” (Warnock, 2005: 95). 
A similar dynamic exists in the province of Manitoba, where the NDP has formed governments 
from 1969 to 1977, 1981 to 1988, and again from 1999 to the present. Known for its pragmatic 
left-wing policy innovation in the 1970s, the most recent NDP administration has strayed very 
far away from its democratic socialist roots.  Wesley argues that the Manitoba NDP has “severed 
its ties to Keynesian social democracy, as applied under [former NDP premiers] Schreyer and 
Pawley. In their place, New Democrats now follow the ‘Third Way’ approach to politics, openly 
pursuing partnerships with the private and voluntary sectors, balancing budgets, and remaining 
at least somewhat open to the ‘integration of the North American economies’” (Wesley, 2005: 
11).  As in Saskatchewan, Manitoba’s unions have taken the position that the NDP, despite its 
flaws, must be supported to prevent the ascendance of an even more right-wing party.  
While key provincial sections of the NDP have moved decisively to the political centre, the 
federal NDP has, more or less, remained committed to traditional social democratic policy 
prescriptions.  However, Jansen and Young’s conclusions appear to presuppose that the federal 
NDP and its provincial sections have parallel ideological approaches and public policy 
orientations.  In practice, the federal NDP and its provincial sections do not see eye to eye on 
several important public policy matters. Historically, NDP provincial sections have been divided 
over questions of federalism and constitutional reform (Savage, 2007).  More recent examples 
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of intra-party tension abound.  For example, while the federal NDP supports the adoption of a 
federal anti-scab law modelled after similar laws passed by NDP governments in Ontario and 
British Columbia, NDP governments in Saskatchewan and Manitoba have refused to adopt anti-
scab laws, despite intense lobbying by the labour movement (Warnock, 2005: 95; Panitch and 
Swartz, 2003: 203).  The federal NDP`s strong support for the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change 
was not shared by the Saskatchewan NDP government, who opposed the Protocol in its early 
stages (Warnock, 2009). The federal NDP’s opposition to Canada’s military involvement in 
Afghanistan was rebuked by Manitoba NDP Premier Gary Doer, who endorsed the military 
effort.  The federal NDP also butted heads with the Manitoba NDP Premier on the desirability of 
protectionist trade policies (National Post, 2009).  
All of this is related to the last problem emerging from Jansen and Young’s methodological focus 
on the national level, which is the treatment of the federal party as an entity wholly separate 
from its provincial branches.  First, it is not clear that the federal and provincial parties can be 
separated so neatly.  Historically, as an integrated federal and provincial party, the two branches 
overlapped considerably in terms of governing structures, personnel and, importantly, money.  
The NDP, and the CCF before it, were founded on very decentralized structures that privileged 
the provincial bodies.  Provincial sections of the party would handle and control membership 
lists, membership dues, and even the running of federal campaigns within their jurisdiction 
(Morton, 1977: 204; Interview with Ron Stipp, 2010).  Provincial party constitutions often give 
the provincial branch control over various aspects of federal affairs.  For instance, even in 2010, 
BC NDP rules around the organization of nomination meetings also extend to federal 
nominations as well (Interview with Stephen Phillips3
Unraveling the “Byzantine complexity of the party’s internal financing” has tested the patience 
of more than a few social scientists (Carty, 1991: 240).  Suffice it to say, the precise financial 
relationship between the different wings of the NDP has been in flux for much of its history.  
Like the CCF before it, the NDP has struggled to meet the financial demands of campaigning on 
par with the Liberals and Conservatives at the federal level.  Grassroots support has generated 
considerable sums, but only in Saskatchewan and Ontario have these amounts been enough to 
consistently support the federal party as well (Paltiel et al, 1966: 390-6; Morton, 1977: 204).  
Historically, membership dues were collected provincially, a proportion of which would then be 
forwarded to the federal party.  However, not all provincial parties could pay, or pay all the 
time, and the federal party has had to devise countless strategies to stabilize these financial 
relationships since its founding.  The beginning of federal government financial support for 
political parties helped the federal party in the 1970s, though it did not keep pace with the 
escalating costs of campaigning (Morton, 1977: 204).  By the 1990s, numerous campaigns to 
give the federal party an independent financial footing were started but eventually abandoned, 
usually due to the objections or intransigence of the key provincial sections (Interviews with Ron 
Stipp and Stephen Phillips, January 15, 2010).  Most recently, the federal and provincial wings 
, January 15, 2010; see also Constitution of 
the New Democratic Party, amended 2006, specifically Article III: Membership, and Article XVI: 
Candidates).  Second, given that Jansen and Young want to test the impact of the new federal 
campaign finance laws on the relations between the NDP and labour, they need to know 
whether any other intervening factors influence what is happening.  When we turn to NDP 
provincial/federal relations, we discover a lot that may muddy Jansen and Young’s conclusions.  
Most importantly, the new campaign finance laws may prove to have had much more effect on 
relations between the different sections of the party than on relations between the party and 
organized labour. 
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signed ‘service contracts’ spelling out their respective responsibilities and financial obligations 
(Stipp, 2010).   
The recent federal campaign finance reforms have accomplished what internal party 
negotiations in the NDP could not – a negotiated separation of the two wings of the party 
concerning financial matters.  While Jansen and Young focus on how the recent rules banning 
union donations may have affected the federal party, they neglect how the rules also banned 
transfers of funds from provincial to federal levels of the same party.4
3. Theory 
  Though the federal NDP 
often received only 15 cents of every dollar in membership dues given to the provincial party, 
the provincial sections also made lump sum contributions, particularly at election time.  For 
instance, Whitehorn reports that provincial sections in Ontario, BC and Saskatchewan 
contributed 47% of the federal NDP’s 1988 multi-million dollar campaign budget, compared to 
unions’ contributions amounting to just 16% of the total (Whitehorn, 1992: 217).  Thus 
unraveling the impact of the new finance rules on the behavior of the federal NDP is more 
complicated than simply subtracting union funds from the mix.  Jansen and Young want to test 
the impact of the new rules by comparing NDP/labour relations before and after their 
introduction, surmising the removal of union funds may lead to an altered relationship and 
direction for the federal party.  But much more has changed for the federal party as a result of 
the new rules than their relationship with labour, and as a result it harder to say just what may 
be affecting its behavior.  The end of provincial financing of the federal party removes a key 
point of leverage for the provincial sections over their federal counterpart, one that may 
ultimately have much more impact on the federal party and its ideological direction than the 
end of union contributions.  At the very least, the union/party link cannot be studied in isolation 
from these other clearly significant relationships. 
The problems with Jansen and Young’s analysis extend to the theories that undergird their 
understanding of the interactions themselves.  Though the authors ultimately reject the 
‘rational exchange’ and ‘political economy’ models proposed at the outset of their paper as 
ineffective explanations for the continuing links between the NDP and organized labour, they 
nonetheless draw on them in characterizing what can be understood as ‘rational’ or how 
changes in the international economy ultimately impinge on politics.  In both cases, the theories 
are too narrowly defined and deployed.  Their characterization of what constitutes rational 
behaviour appears reductionist, ignoring historical context (i.e. what different actors may learn 
about their environment and each other over time), and seemingly recognizes only short-term 
instrumental gains as ‘rational’.  Their understanding of political economy is almost wholly 
deterministic, where changes in the global economy enter the political arena as an exogenous 
factor that ‘forces’ actors to do this or that, instead of appearing as a terrain that both affects 
and is affected by what people do.   
Taking up rationality first, the authors argue that the rational exchange model suggests that 
unions seek policies and social democratic parties seek votes.  However, according to Jansen and 
Young, unions have not proven very effective at mobilizing union members to vote NDP and the 
NDP has never captured federal power, gaining influence only in the rare minority government 
in which it can extract concessions from a larger party.  Thus, for the authors, the relationship 
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between labour and the NDP is not premised on rational exchange considerations but instead 
on shared ideological commitments: 
Labour unions support social democratic political parties not in the hope of 
improving the fate of unions or their workers but rather as a way of furthering 
the objectives of social democracy—objectives to which trade unionist leaders 
are generally personally committed (Jansen and Young, 2009: 661). 
So too does the NDP favour ideology over votes: 
Social democratic parties are less concerned with vote maximization than they 
are with furthering a particular set of ideas in the public sphere. This tendency 
can be even more pronounced in situations where the social democratic party is 
a minor or “third” party and faces less pressure to compromise positions in 
order to improve its chances of forming a government (Jansen and Young, 2009: 
661). 
These characterizations of ‘rationality’ contain a host of problems.  First, Jansen and Young 
underestimate the historic influence of the CCF/NDP, reducing it to the few times the party 
could gain explicit agreements on policy from a minority government (for example, Trudeau in 
1972).  This ignores how the party influenced the policy mix of the federal Liberals at key historic 
moments when CCF/NDP fortunes appeared to be on the rise, as in 1945, the mid-1960s, and 
again just before the 1988 election.  The establishment of the postwar welfare state in the 
1940s, the nationalization of health insurance in the 1960s, and the Liberals’ critical positions on 
free trade in the 1980s were hardly likely without the perception of an electoral threat from the 
left (Whitaker, 1977: 136-56; McLeod, 1971: 89-90; Brodie and Jenson, 1988: 323).  Nor is it 
historically accurate to suggest the CCF/NDP was satisfied to simply ‘further ideas’ in the public 
sphere.  As many accounts of the party and biographical sketches of key players make clear, the 
party really believed it could overtake the Liberals and become a governing federal party.  While 
these hopes may appear overly ambitious in retrospect, there is no denying that elites running 
the party believed them in 1945, 1965, 1988 and, arguably, most recently in 2008 (Morton, 
1977: 14, 61; Beck, 1968: 386; Steed, 1999: 430; Erickson and Laycock, 2009: 105).  
It is also hard to understand what the authors mean by ‘ideological’. It is as though ideas are 
ends in themselves, rather than frameworks for understanding and transforming the world.  To 
suggest that union leaders support social democracy “not in the hope of improving the fate of 
unions or their workers” but for ideological reasons begs the question – what exactly is social 
democracy for?  Historically, the rational benefits to workers were clear: an expanding social 
wage through public services and supportive state regulation of the labour-management 
relationship that would favour union organizing and participation in the workplace (Eley, 2002; 
Coldwell, 1945; Knowles, 1961).  Jansen and Young themselves appear to grant this when they 
admit that unions may stick with a social democratic party “in the hopes of achieving more 
fundamental policy change in the longer term,” an observation confirmed by their union sources 
who argue that voting NDP will keep the federal Liberals on the left (2009: 661, 665).  But 
somehow this only amounts to a ‘second order rationality’ to the authors, who perceive first 
order rationality as one where unions remain “free agents who can work with various parties to 
achieve incremental change” (2009: 661).  Of course, this assumes that there would be other 
parties to make incremental deals with, an assumption not supported by the historic policy 
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preferences of the two major national parties (Brodie and Jenson, 1988; Heron, 1992; Roberts 
and Bullen, 1994; McCrorie, 1995; Finkel, 1995; Kealey, 1995).  Trying to negotiate with forces 
uninterested in negotiations is not very rational. 
Turning to political economy, the authors argue that changes in the global economy are forcing 
a new relationship on unions and social democratic parties the world over. The language used 
by Jansen and Young to describe these changes is entirely passive and tends to reify abstractions 
like ‘globalization’ and ‘Keynesianism’ as if they were actors in their own right.  Thus 
Keynesianism “retreats” (2009: 660) or “collapses” (2009: 666) while international capital 
“erodes” union densities (2009: 665) or “forces” social democratic parties to sideline labour 
(2009: 666).  Here the authors rely on Piazza’s work on globalization and union-party 
relationships where he argues that there is clear link between the two.  As Piazza puts it:  
The mobility of capital under globalization weakens the bargaining power of 
unions and union density falls, diluting a previously important electoral base of 
centre-left political parties. To improve their electoral fortunes, these parties 
jettison their connections to organized labour (Piazza 2001, as cited in Jansen 
and Young 2009: 660). 
While the authors admit that Piazza’s characterization of globalization and the party-union link 
does not seem to explain the NDP/union relationship federally in Canada, they nonetheless 
seem to accept that globalization affects all economies in this way and limits what governments 
can do.  This is a highly deterministic reading of the impact of changing global economic 
relationships, one that appears to discount the role of the state in not simply acquiescing to 
global pressures, but in authoring them.  A considerable body of work empirically demonstrates 
that globalization is far from clear in its impacts on any particular state.  From taxes, to social 
policy, to the behaviour of social democratic parties, researchers have found considerable 
variation in how advanced capitalist democracies have and can respond to globalizing pressures 
(Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Swank and Steinmo, 2002; Dreher, 2006; van Kersbergen, 2003).  
Nor is Piazza’s work the only source for insight on the changing relationship between labour and 
left parties.  Needless to say, a considerable body of work on social democracy, not cited by 
Jansen and Young, challenges Piazza’s rather deterministic linkage of globalization, social 
democracy and organized labour (e.g. Callaghan, 2002; Moschonas, 2002). 
4. Understanding the durability of NDP/labour solidarity  
Jansen and Young set out to “understand both the character and the underpinnings of the 
relationship between organized labour and the New Democrats” by locating “the history of this 
relationship in the context of theoretical accounts of trade union and political party 
motivations” drawn from the “comparative literature” (2009: 657-8).  We wonder why they did 
not elect to draw from the extensive Canadian literature pertinent to these themes (for 
instance, in critical political economy and labour e.g. Panitch and Swartz 2003, or labour history 
e.g. Kealey 1976, or Palmer 1992).  On the face of it, their choices may simply reflect 
methodological affinities.  Both their comparative examples and some of their own work fit 
within the positivist, variable testing tradition while the Canadian alternatives utilize more 
historical and qualitative approaches.  But the problem is that their comparative models do not 
adequately come to grips the specificities of the Canadian case.  Without discounting the 
benefits of insights from comparativists, we agree with scholars like Smiley, Cairns, and Nesbitt-
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Larking that Canadian political circumstances do not lend themselves to the unproblematic 
importing of theories and approaches developed elsewhere (Smiley 1974; Cairns 1975; Nesbit-
Larking 2009).  Instead we require approaches that engage with the specificities of Canadian 
circumstances, both historically and theoretically. 
In the case of the links between the NDP and organized labour, this means we must explore the 
actual emergence and development of the relationship over time, carefully attending to 
relations amongst different players, their different interests, and how changing historical 
circumstances altered their view of things. This requires the use of a comparative historical 
method, which highlights how different outcomes are the product of long historical processes. 
This is also linked to a different understanding of political economy as an analytical framework. 
As Clement and Williams point out, “[s]ome have mistakenly attributed economic determinism 
to Canadian political economy, but it has focused primarily on human agency – choices and 
decisions made by political, economic, and social actors and their effects” (Clement and 
Williams, 1989: 11). In other words, political economy highlights the interaction of social forces / 
actors with the material circumstances they encounter, and the outcomes of the struggles they 
engage in to deal with those circumstances are understood to create new structuring conditions 
which enable or limit capacities and strategic options.  As Mike Davis has put it in his discussion 
of the American working class, it is the “sedimented historical experiences of the working class”, 
the “results of these historical collisions” between capital and labour which create “new 
structural forms” that shape “the subjective capacities for class organization and consciousness” 
(Davis, 1986: 7). Goran Therborn adds that “how social forces will actually act in a given 
situation”, including the form of politics adopted, “depends centrally upon the forms of action 
which have been institutionalized in their founding moments” (Therborn, 1983: 40).  For this 
kind of analysis of the linkage between unions and social democracy, we must turn to both 
Canadian and comparative labour history and the history of social democracy. 
Union-party linkages in Canada evolved over a long period and represented a learning process 
by labour and political leaders. A long-running debate in Canadian labour circles in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century involved just how labour should pursue its political 
objectives.  Nor was this debate unique to Canada. The question of whether workers needed to 
engage in political (and not just economic) action and of what kind preoccupied the labour 
movements in all western countries, though different economic / class configurations and 
political relations contributed to different outcomes (Lipset, 1983; Therborn, 1983).  
Though initially hostile to labour, given their social base in various fractions of Canadian capital, 
both the Conservative and Liberal federal parties tried to woo working class voters with various 
promises in the late 19th century.  Southern Ontario’s working class was a particular 
battleground, with the McDonald Tories offering up the Trade Unions Act in 1872, 
decriminalizing unions so as to undercut their Liberal political rival George Brown and 
opportunistically gain electoral advantage amongst Toronto’s craft workers for some years 
(Kealey, 1976: 53; Palmer, 1992: 110-11; Brodie and Jenson, 1988: 40). But neither party 
delivered much once in power, which intensified the debate over whether unions should 
support a separate labour party or throw its support behind an existing party. The Liberals under 
Laurier continually dangled pro-labour legislation before workers to keep them onside, with 
various ‘Lib-Lab’ candidates straddling the line between incorporation into the party and an 
independent labour politics.  The intensification of class conflict during the First World War 
proved a catalyst for independent labour politics, though a serious federal party did not come 
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together until the founding of the CCF in 1932.  Even so, while larger sections of working class 
activists were convinced of the need for an independent labour politics, the labour movement 
continued to be divided on the issue of partisan affiliation, largely defined by the split between 
the non-partisan and Gompers-influenced Trades and Labour Congress and the Canadian 
Congress of Labour, many (but not all) of whose affiliates were attached to the CCF (Abella, 
1973).  However, the Second World War provided much more convincing evidence that an 
independent political strategy could deliver major elements of the labour movement’s reform 
agenda: twinned with workers’ economic militancy, the CCF’s mounting electoral pressure on 
the Liberals in the mid-1940s (both federally and provincially) provided the basis for a 
breakthrough in legislated labour rights and the creation of the post-war welfare state.  More 
formal links between unions and a left party were created with the founding of the NDP in 1961. 
Both before and since, countless experiences have continued to add to the ‘common sense’ 
view that workers’ interests and representatives would never have more than a subordinate 
role in the Conservative or Liberal parties, and that an ongoing competitive prod from a more 
left wing party was essential to maintain those programmes supportive to labour. 
The mainstream parties’ marginalization of labour within their coalitions is also addressed by 
the Canadian political economy tradition. First, as Brodie and Jenson have argued, despite their 
appeal to Canadian national identity and use of brokerage politics to mask class divisions, these 
parties do have a class base, rooted in the particular interests of various elements of the 
Canadian capitalist class. As such, while working class votes are often tactically useful to these 
parties, the distance the latter will go to win those votes is limited, particularly when workers’ 
interests conflict with those at the helm of these parties (Brodie and Jenson, 1988: 2-3, 40-1). 
Historical experience has shown that pursuing alliances with these parties is of limited use to the 
union movement. 
Thus, the historical and critical political economy literatures offer a deeper set of reasons why 
the relationship between organized labour and the NDP would continue, despite the recent 
change in campaign finance laws and other pressures emanating from the changing organization 
of the Canadian and global economies. An examination of the labour movement’s political 
history sheds light on why labour tends to conclude that it still has no other political partners 
who would realistically take their concerns more seriously. Thus history and politics matter; the 
labour movement’s political practices are the result of lessons learned in the attempts to cope, 
respond to and resist changes in political economic structures and processes. They are not 
determined by them in a simple way; nor will legislative change strip away the accumulation of 
political experience. 
Conclusion 
We agree with Jansen and Young that considerable evidence exists that the recent changes in 
federal campaign finance laws have led to a renegotiation of the relationship between the New 
Democratic Party and organized labour in Canada rather than a break in their historic links.  And 
their work has produced some new information about how this new relationship has been 
restructured.  But we do not believe that they have provided an effective explanation about why 
or how this has come to pass.  Their argument that the NDP and labour maintain their 
relationship due to a “shared ideological commitment” is, ultimately, too vague, lacking both 
evidence and theoretical support.  We have highlighted above the key problems we find in their 
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analysis in terms of the evidence they draw upon and the methodological choices they have 
made.  Yet, in our view, the root of the problem appears to be located in the narrow form of 
theory they employ to understand the phenomena they are trying to grapple with.  As authors 
well versed in the literatures concerning comparative party finance, it is perhaps not surprising 
that they have drawn on rational choice or the new, more narrow forms of political economy 
(influenced by mainstream economics departments) in attempting to understand these recent 
changes in federal party finance rules as both approaches dominate that field.  The authors 
appear less well versed in literatures concerning comparative and Canadian social democracy 
and labour studies, which we think is a major oversight for an article attempting to explain the 
relationship between a social democratic party and its national labour constituency. 
By contrast, albeit in a fairly brief and schematic way for the purposes of this article, we have 
argued that the NDP and organized labour’s continuing relationship, despite the recent 
campaign finance reforms, is not really that surprising if we examine the historical origins and 
development of that relationship and utilize a broader and more dynamic understanding of 
political economy.  With this approach, we can see how Canadian labour leaders and the NDP 
have re-evaluated their relationship at many points in their history, but have chosen to remain 
connected due to their larger shared project of influencing the Canadian state’s regulation of 
the economy to favour different groups, i.e. working people generally and organized labour 
specifically.  It is precisely this critical view of “political economy”, one that sees economies as 
crucially affected by political decisions rather than global forces or some invisible hand, that 
explains both their continuing links to each other and the lack of options for organized labour in 
seeking long-term benefits from either of the traditional governing parties at the federal level. 
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